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Abstract. Bayesian model comparison is often based on the poste-
rior distribution over the set of compared models. This distribution
is often observed to concentrate on a single model even when other
measures of model fit or forecasting ability indicate no strong prefer-
ence. Furthermore, a moderate change in the data sample can eas-
ily shift the posterior model probabilities to concentrate on another
model. We document overconfidence in two high-profile applications
in economics and neuroscience. To shed more light on the sources
of overconfidence we derive the sampling variance of the Bayes fac-
tor in univariate and multivariate linear regression. The results show
that overconfidence is likely to happen when i) the compared models
give very different approximations of the data-generating process, ii)
the models are very flexible with large degrees of freedom that are
not shared between the models, and iii) the models underestimate
the true variability in the data.
Model comparison | Bootstrap | DSGE | Macroeconomic policy | Brain
connectivity
Bayesian inference has gained widespread popularity inrecent decades, largely propelled by advances in com-
puting power and efficient simulation algorithms like Markov
Chain Monte Carlo (1) and Sequential Monte Carlo (2). The
Bayesian approach to model comparison is theoretically at-
tractive and the standard in many fields in both the natural
and the social sciences. Some examples are (3) in Linguis-
tics, (4) in Economics, and (5) in Neuroscience. Hypothesis
testing is a special case of model selection. Problems with
classical hypothesis testing and the so called reproducibility
crisis has directed attention to Bayesian model selection as an
alternative, see for example (6) and (7).
A posterior distribution over a set of models makes it
straightforward to select one of the models for further study,
or to average inference across the models using Bayesian Model
Averaging (BMA, 8). Bayesian model comparison based on
posterior model probabilities has many attractive properties:
i) it allows the compared models to be non-nested, ii) it is
consistent when the data generating process is among the
compared models (theM-closed perspective in 9), iii) it will
asymptotically concentrate the posterior probability mass on
the model closest to the data generating process when all
compared models are misspecified (M-open perspective in 9),
and iv) it has direct connections to out-of-sample forecasting
performance and cross-validation (9–13).
However, Bayesian model probabilities sometimes behave
puzzling in practise in that the posterior model distribution
often concentrates entirely on one model, giving the impression
of overwhelming support for that model. At the same time
other forms of model comparison, e.g. predictive performance
on a test set, do not show nearly the same degree of discrimina-
tion. This overconfidence is part of the folklore among expert
Bayesians, but remains largely undocumented in the scientific
literature, barring brief passages such as in (14) or (15) who
state ’In practice we have observed a tendency of BMA to be
over confident in weighting models—assigning weights that
are too close to zero or one’. Moreover, theoretical work on
overconfidence in Bayesian model probabilities is scarce. Two
recent exceptions are (16) and (17). The asymptotic behavior
of Bayesian model comparison when the compared models
are equally misspecified is explored in (16), showing random
walk like behavior of the log Bayes factor in large samples.
The overconfidence of Bayesian posteriors and Bayesian model
probabilities is also highlighted by (17) who use bagging of
posteriors to make Bayesian inference more robust.
Our paper sheds light on the sources of overconfidence of
Bayesian model probabilities by deriving the sampling variance
of the Bayes factor in linear regression. We show that overcon-
fidence is likely to be happen when i) the compared models
give very different approximations of the data-generating pro-
cess, ii) the models are very flexible, i.e. have large degrees of
freedom, and that complexity is not shared between the mod-
els, and iii) the models are unable to replicate the variability
in the data generating process. We also extend the results to
multivariate regression.
The next section motivates our study by showing dis-
turbingly clear signs of overconfidence in a high-profile applica-
tions in macroeconomics (4) and neuroscience (18). The rest of
the paper studies the sources of overconfidence mathematically
through the between-sample variance of the Bayes factor for
Bayesian linear regression models. Proofs of the results are
given in the Supplementary material.
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ment this overconfidence in high-profile applications in macroe-
conomics and neuroscience, and characterize the sources of
overconfidence in a regression setting.
M.V. proposed the initial idea for the paper and designed research. M.V., O.O. and S.D. proved
the mathematical results. M.V., M.M., O.O. and S.D. wrote the computer code, analyzed data and
conducted the experiments. M.V., O.O. and S.D. wrote the initial draft of the paper. All authors
edited the paper and contributed in discussions.
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
1M.V., O.O. and S.D. contributed equally to this work.
2To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: oscar.oelrich@stat.su.se
| March 10, 2020 | vol. XXX | no. XX | 1–10
ar
X
iv
:2
00
3.
04
02
6v
1 
 [m
ath
.ST
]  
9 M
ar 
20
20
Background and motivation
Bayesian model probabilities. Consider comparing a set of
K models, M = {M1, ...,MK}, for the observed data y =
(y1, ..., yn)T , each depending on a vector of model parameters
θk . A common way of doing Bayesian model comparison is
to use the posterior distribution over the model setM,
p(Mk|y) ∝ p(y|Mk)p(Mk),
where p(Mk) is the prior probability of model Mk, p(y|Mk) is
the marginal likelihood
p(y|Mk) =
∫
p(y|θk,Mk)p(θk|Mk)dθk,
and p(θk|Mk) is the prior distribution for θk. The Bayes factor
for comparing model Mk to model Ml is
Bk,l =
p(y|Mk)
p(y|Ml) .
Micro-based general equilibrium models in macroeconomics.
To illustrate the effect of overconfidence in real-world applica-
tions, we first consider a class of Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (19) models widely used in economics. DSGE
models are the main models used for policy analysis and predic-
tion at essentially every major monetary and fiscal institution
in the world. Bayesian model probabilities is the standard
tool for model comparison and selection among DSGE models
(19). The seven-variable Smets-Wouters (4) model is the de
facto starting point for most DSGE models used in practi-
cal work. The Smets-Wouters model is a probability model
for seven macroeconomic time series using a complex micro-
funded model based on optimizing representative agents in the
economy with rational expectations. The model dynamics are
driven by seven underlying latent time series shocks, such as
shocks in technology and preferences. In (4), the base version
of the model is compared with eight variants that restricts
certain model parameters to known values. The posterior
model probabilities based on the marginal likelihoods from (4)
is given in Table 1, showing conclusive evidence in favor of
model M3.
Table 1. Posterior model probabilities in the DSGE example.
Base M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8
0.01 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
To investigate if overconfidence is a concern we approximate
the sampling distribution of the posterior model probabilities
using the circular block boostrap for time series (20). Figure 1
shows results from 1000 bootstrap replicates. The vertical bars
correspond to models and the horizontal stripes to bootstrap
replicates. The bootstrap replicates have been sorted with
respect to the probabilities of the baseline model. The colors
represent the posterior model probabilities. For example, a
row where one of the columns has a stripe of dark purple
implies that the model in that column has strong support
(Pr(Mk|Data) > 0.9), for the given bootstrap replicate, and
all other models weak support (Pr(Mk|Data) ≤ 0.1). Figure 1
shows that the conclusion from Table 1, where modelM3 came
out as the sure winner, is far from robust. In a large fraction of
Fig. 1. Posterior model probabilities for the nine DSGE models in (4) for 1000
bootstrap replicates. The bars correspond to models and the horizontal stripes
to bootstrap replicates, which have been sorted with respect to the probabilities
of the base model. The colors correspond to posterior model probabilities. For
example, a row where one of the bars has a stripe of dark purple implies that the
model corresponding to that bar has strong support (p(Mk|y) > 0.9) for the given
bootstrap replicate, and all other models weak support (p(Mk|y) ≤ 0.1).
Fig. 2. Sampling variability in the DSGE model selection process for three posterior
model probability (PMP) thresholds. The figure displays the percentage of boot-
strap samples in which one model is strongly preferred, or in which the evidence is
inconclusive.
the bootstrap samples, we actually have Pr(M7|Data) > 0.9;
there is also the same level of support for the base model in a
non-negligible fraction of bootstrap replicates.
Figure 2 displays the percentage of bootstrap replicates
where there is strong support for one of the models (the
posterior model probability, PMP, is larger than 0.9, 0.95 and
0.99, respectively), or where the evidence is inconclusive. If we
take the outcome that one of the PMPs are larger than 0.99
as conclusive, then Figure 2 shows that we have conclusive
evidence in 35% of the replicates, but spread over 5 different
models. We therefore conclude that the model comparison in
(4) suffers from overconfidence with misleadingly conclusive
support for M3. The authors of (4) seem in fact unimpressed
by the strong support for model M3 as they silently continue
the remainder of the article with the analysis of the base
model.
Causal brain interactions in neuroscience. Dynamic Causal
Models (DCM) (21) is a popular class of models that use data
from functional MRI (fMRI) brain scans to investigate how
brain regions interact during an experimental task. Bayesian
posterior model probabilities are the recommended method of
model comparison for DCMs (22)[Ch.37]. DCMs are used in
(18) to analyze how three brain regions that are known to be
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Fig. 3. Two of the compared DCM models for the three brain auditory brain regions: i)
left posterior temporal sulcus (P), ii) left anterior superior temporal sulcus (A) and iii)
pars orbitalis of the inferior frontal gyru (F). Dashed orange arrows are endogenous
task-unrelated connections which are present in all models, while solid black arrows
are connections whose strength is modulated by the hearing task. The location of the
auditory input is indicated by the red square with an arrow.
Fig. 4. Sampling variability in the DCM model selection process for three posterior
model probability (PMP) thresholds. The figure displays the percentage of boot-
strap samples in which one model is strongly preferred, or in which the evidence is
inconclusive.
associated with speech processing interact when hearing intel-
ligible speech. We reanalyze their data, but exclude subject 5
since it is a duplicate of subject 4. This leaves 25 subjects for
the analysis.
Figure 3 displays two of the compared models. A particular
question of interest is in which of the three regions the auditory
input is localized, regardless of the presence or absence of con-
nectivity patterns. Such posterior probabilities are obtained
by summing over all possible connections for a given source
location, and is presented in Table 2, which is identical to
Table 1 in (18) even with subject 5 removed. According to
Table 2 we are supposed to be absolutely certain that input
only enters through region P. Figure 4 however shows that
in a non-negligible fraction of bootstrap samples we actually
obtain conclusive evidence for region A. Figure shows the
bootstrapped sampling distribution for the log Bayes factor
comparing the hypothesis P against A. The regions of evidence
from the well known conservative Kass-Raftery scale (23) are
also indicated in the figure. The sampling variance is very
large, and the regions of weak or inconclusive support is but
a small interval between large masses of very strong support
for either of the two hypotheses. Most of the mass for strong
evidence happens to be located on P in this example, but it is
clear that the Bayes factor can very easily be overconfident.
Table 2. Posterior model probabilities in the DCM example.
A F P AF PA PF PAF
0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Overconfidence in Gaussian linear regression models
Univariate response. We explore the sources of overconfidence
of Bayesian model comparison by deriving the sampling vari-
ance of the Bayes factor for two compared models in a finite
Fig. 5. Bootstrap approximation of the sampling distribution of log BFP,A comparing
the family of models where the auditory input is localized only in region P against the
family of models where it is localized only in region A. The sampling distribution is
approximated by 10000 bootstrap resamples of subjects. The Kass-Raftery scale of
evidence is displayed by the colored regions. The observed log BFP,A is marked
out by a pink dot.
sample setting. To get tractable and easily interpretable re-
sults we consider Gaussian linear regression models with known
error variances σ21 and σ22 ; Remark 2 discusses the case with
unknown variances. The data generating process M∗ is given
by
M∗ : y = X∗β∗ + ε∗ ε∗ ∼ N(0, σ2∗In), [1]
where X∗ is a n × p∗ matrix of full rank. We compare the
misspecified models
M1 : y = X1β1 + ε1 ε1 ∼ N(0, σ21In) [2]
M2 : y = X2β2 + ε2 ε2 ∼ N(0, σ22In),
where Xi is known and of full rank pi, and βi is a pi×1 vector
of unknown regression coefficients.
We use Zellner’s g-prior for both models
βi|σ2i ∼ N
(
0, gσ2i (XTi Xi)−1
)
for some shrinkage constant g > 0, but it is straightforward
to extend the results to general normal priors. The posterior
is of the form
βi|σ2i , y ∼ N
(
β˜i, κσ
2
i
(
XTi Xi
)−1)
,
where
β˜i = κ
(
XTi Xi
)−1
XTi y,
and κ = g
g+1 is the shrinkage factor. The Bayesian posterior
predictive mean of modelMi is a linear smoother (24, Ch. 3.10)
of the form yˆi = Hiy, where Hi = κPi is a shrunken version
of the least squares projection matrix Pi = Xi(XTi Xi)−1XTi .
The marginal likelihood for model Mi is given by
p(y|Mi) = (2piσ2i )−
n
2 (1− κ)pi/2 exp
{
− 12σ2i
yT (In −Hi) y
}
.
Our first result is derived under the assumption that the
error variances in the two models are known and equal. This
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case gives a particularly simple expression with interesting
interpretation. See the Appendix for results when the model
variances differ. Let ‖x‖2 = (xTx)1/2 be the Euclidean norm
of the vector x and ‖A‖F =
√
tr(ATA) the Frobenius norm
of the matrix A.
Theorem 1. The sampling mean and variance of the log
Bayes factor for the two regression models in [2], assuming
equal and fixed variance σ2, with respect to the data-generating
process in [1] is
E(log B12(y)) =
KL2 −KL1
2− κ +
p1 − p2
2
(
log(1− κ) + κσ
2
∗
σ2
)
Var(log B12(y)) =
σ2∗
σ2
‖µˆ1 − µˆ2‖22
σ2
+
(
σ2∗√
2σ2
‖H1 −H2‖F
)2
,
where µˆi = Hiµ∗ is the projection of the true mean vector µ∗
onto model Mi and KLi is the Kullback-Leibler divergence of
model Mi with estimate µˆi from the true M∗.
Theorem 1 shows that the Bayes factor favors models that
are KL-close to the data-generating process, which is in line
with the general asymptotic result in for example (25, 26), but
also that it penalizes complex models.
More interestingly, Theorem 1 shows that the variance
increases with: i) ‖µˆ1 − µˆ2‖22 /σ2, ii) ‖H1 −H2‖F , and iii) the
variance ratio σ2∗/σ2. We discuss each of these parts in turn.
It is straightforward to prove that µˆi minimizes the KL
divergence of p(y|Mi) from p(y|M∗) (see the Appendix); hence,
µˆi is the best approximation of p (y|M∗) that model Mi
is capable of. It is also easy to show (see the Appendix)
that KL(M1(µˆ1) ‖M2(µˆ2)) = ‖µˆ1 − µˆ2‖22 /2σ2, the KL diver-
gence between the best approximating models N(y|µˆ1, σ2) and
N(y|µˆ2, σ2), which happens to be symmetric when σ1 = σ2.
The first term in Theorem 1 therefore shows that the variance
of the Bayes factor tends to be large when the two models
approximate M∗ in widely different ways. This explains why
continuous model expansion, where a model is embedded in a
larger family via a continuous parameter, is preferred over a
comparison of a discrete set of well separated models (27). A
model is always surrounded by other similar models in contin-
uous model expansions. We also note that the recommended
strategy in (27) is to compare widely different models that
’stake out the corners in the model space’ in order to capture
the true model uncertainty. This is a good strategy when one
can afford to stake out the corners with a dense set of models,
preferably even a continuum of models, but this is rarely the
case. A much more common situation is when the model
space is staked out using a small set of models. Unfortunately,
Theorem 1 shows that the posterior model probabilities are
then highly likely to be overconfident.
To interpret the term ‖H1 −H2‖F recall that the degrees
of freedom of a linear smoother, yˆ = Hy, is given by tr(H) (28).
The next lemma shows that ‖H1 −H2‖2F is the total degrees
of freedom of the two models that is not shared between them.
Lemma 1. ‖H1 −H2‖2F measures the total non-shared de-
grees of freedom of the models in [2]:
‖H1 −H2‖2F = κ2
(
tr(P1) + tr(P2)− 2
(
s+ Σri=1 cos2(θk+i)
))
,
where p1 = tr(P1) ≥ tr(P2) = p2 ≥ 1, θj ∈ [0, pi/2] for j =
1, ..., p2 are the principal angles between S1 = span(H1) and
S2 = span(H2), s = dim (S1 ∩ S2) is the number of θj that
are exactly zero and r is the number of θj in the open interval
(0, pi/2) .
By Lemma 1, ‖H1 −H2‖2F is the total complexity of the
two models, tr(P1)+tr(P2), reduced by the s completely shared
dimensions and by the cosine of the principal angles of the
r partially shared dimensions, shrunk by the precision of the
prior. Hence, Var(log B12(y)) is not affected by any complexity
that is shared between the models. Comparison of a dense
set of nested models, e.g. variable selection in regression, is
therefore expected to less prone to overconfidence since there
is often a large overlap between compared models. Figure 6
gives an abstract illustration of models, divergences between
models and their shared/non-shared complexities.
Finally, both ‖µˆ1 − µˆ2‖22 /σ2 and ‖H1 −H2‖F in Theorem
1 are inflated by the error variance ratio σ2∗/σ2 in the expression
for Var(log B12(y)). Models that are unable to generate enough
variation in their data distribution are therefore particularly
susceptible to overconfidence.
We make the following additional remarks about Theorem
1.
Remark 1. Var(log B12(y)) does not directly depend on the
degree of misspecification of the two models relative to the true
M∗; only the divergence between the models matters. However,
the degree of misspecification restricts how far apart the models
can be. One way to see this is by noting that ‖µˆ1 − µˆ2‖22 has
the upper bound
‖µˆ∗ − µˆ1‖22 + ‖µˆ∗ − µˆ2‖22 + 2 ‖µˆ∗ − µˆ1‖22 ‖µˆ∗ − µˆ2‖22 ,
which under equal degree of misspecification simplifies to
‖µˆ1 − µˆ2‖22 ≤ 4 ‖µˆ∗ − µˆi‖22 .
Hence, in problems where all models are very misspecified
there is greater scope for the models to approximate p(y|M∗)
in markedly different ways, and therefore greater risk of over-
confidence.
Remark 2. Since the known variance σ2 enters the mean
and variance in Theorem 1 as a multiplicative factor 1/σ2, it
is straightforward to generalize Theorem 1 to the case with a
common and unknown variance by applying the law of total
variance. The end result is that the factor 1/σ2 is replaced by
its prior expectation, but the two main terms ‖µˆ1 − µˆ2‖22 /σ2
and ‖H1 −H2‖F remain. The case with unknown and different
variances seems to be intractable, but numerical experiments
indicate that the same three factors are driving Var(log B12(y)).
Remark 3. The technique behind Theorem 1 can also be
used for regression models with heteroscedastic variance as
the log of the marginal likelihood remains quadratic in y with
In − Hi replaced by Σ−1/2ε (In − Hi)Σ−1/2ε , where Σε is the
n× n covariance matrix of errors. This framework includes
the popular Gaussian process regression models in machine
learning where
yi = xTi β + f(x),
and the function f(x) follows a Gaussian process with a given
covariance kernel. The log marginal likelihood is given in
Equation 2.43 of (29).
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Fig. 6. Illustrating divergence and complexity of models. Each figure displays the data generating process (M∗) as a black point. The two models M1 and M2 are depicted as
circles where the area of each circle indicates the expressiveness, or complexity, of the model, i.e. tr(Hi). The red points represent µˆi, the best approximation to M∗ within
Mi. Finally, the dotted line illustrates the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the models, i.e. ||µˆ1 − µˆ2||. The left graph shows models with no shared complexity, the
middle graph shows models with substantial shared complexity, and the graph to the right shows models without shared complexity where one of the models is closer to M∗.
Multivariate response. The previous section shows that over-
confidence is a bigger concern when the compared models are
approximating the data-generating process in very different
ways. The DSGE models from (4) are seemingly similar, how-
ever; they only differ from the baseline model by setting a
single parameter to a specific value. Note however that the
results in the previous section are derived for the case with
a univariate response, while the DSGE models are multivari-
ate model with seven time series responses. This subsection
extends the previous results to multivariate regression and
highlights some special properties for this more general case.
The data-generating processM∗ is given by the multivariate
regression
M∗ : Y = X∗B∗ + E∗ E∗ ∼ N(0, In,Σ∗), [3]
and we consider comparing the following models
M1 : Y = X1B1 + E1 E1 ∼ N(0, In,Σ1) [4]
M2 : Y = X2B2 + E2 E2 ∼ N(0, In,Σ2),
where N(µ,A1, A2) denotes the matrix variate distribution, Y
is n×q , Xi is known and of full rank pi, and Bi is a pi×q vector
of unknown parameters. The error term Ei = (ε1i, ε2i, ..., εni)′
is an n × q matrix, following a matrix normal distribution,
with rows that are iid N(0,Σi). We let βi = vec(Bi), and use
Zellner’s g-prior for the regression coefficients.
Theorem 2. The sampling mean and variance of the log
Bayes factor for the two multivariate regression models in [4]
with respect to the data-generating process in [3] is
E(log B12(y)) =
KL2 −KL1
2− κ
+ p1 − p22
(
log(1− κ) + κtr
(
Σ−1Σ∗
))
Var(log B12(y)) =
1
2tr
(
Ω2
)
‖H2 −H1‖2F
+
∥∥(µˆ2 − µˆ1)Σ−1/2Ω1/2∥∥2
F
,
where Ω ≡ Σ−1/2Σ∗Σ−1/2 is a multivariate generalization of
the variance ratio σ2∗/σ2 and µˆi = Hiµ∗ is the projection of
the true mean vector µ∗ onto model Mi.
The interpretation remains largely the same as in the uni-
variate case, with the added insight that not all differences in
the models are equally important due to the appearance of
the generalized variance ratio Ω in
∥∥(µˆ2 − µˆ1)Σ−1/2Ω1/2∥∥2
F
.
To show this more precisely, we perform the two spectral
decompositions:
Σ = UΛUT =
(
UΛ1/2
) (
UΛ1/2
)T
Σ∗ = U∗Λ∗UT∗ =
(
U∗Λ1/2∗
) (
U∗Λ1/2∗
)T
,
where U = (u1, ..., up) and U∗ = (u∗1, ..., u∗p) are matri-
ces of eigenvectors, and Λ = Diag(λ1, ..., λp) and Λ∗ =
Diag(λ∗1, ..., λ∗p) are diagonal matrices of eigenvalues. Now,
Σ−1/2 = UΛ−1/2 and Ω = Λ−1/2UTU∗Λ∗UT∗ UΛ−1/2, there-
fore
(µˆ2 − µˆ1)Σ−1/2Ω1/2 = (µˆ2 − µˆ1)UΛ−1/2
(
Λ−1/2UTU∗Λ1/2∗
)
.
The n× p matrix (µˆ1 − µˆ2)UΛ−1/2 contains the differences in
predictions in the directions of the principal components of Σ,
rescaled to unit variance. The p×pmatrix Λ−1/2UTU∗Λ1/2∗ has
element
√
λ∗j/λi cos(φui,u∗j ) in its ith row, jth column, where
cos(φui,u∗j ) = uTi u∗j measures the degree of alignment of pairs
of eigenvectors from Σ and Σ∗. Hence, var logB12(Y ) will be
large when the models make very different prediction on linear
combinations of response variables where the eigenvectors of
Σ and Σ∗ align, and the variance ratio λ∗j/λi is large. This
agrees with the analysis of forecasting performance in (30)
for an open-economy extension of the Smets-Wouters model.
In addition, (30) show that a multivariate measure of out-of-
sample forecasting performance is almost entirely driven by
forecasting errors in employment, one of the least important
variables from a central bank perspective.
Discussion and Conclusion
We have demonstrated that Bayesian posterior model proba-
bilities can be overconfident in the sense of spuriously picking
out one of the compared models as the only probable model
in a set of compared models, while at the same time being
equally certain about another model in a slightly different
dataset. We have analyzed the sources of this overconfidence
by deriving the sample variance of the log Bayes factor for
univariate and multivariate regression.
The main message is that overconfidence is likely to be
a problem when the compared models give very different
approximations of the data-generating process and when the
compared models are flexible in a way that is not shared
among the models. The same is true for the multivariate
setting, with the added nuance that overconfidence will be
Oelrich et al. | March 10, 2020 | vol. XXX | no. XX | 5
largest when the models are different with respect to specific
linear combinations of the response variables.
Our results motivate several interesting avenues for future
research. First, the linear regression setup was chosen since it
provides a clear view of what drives overconfidence. It would
be illuminating to derive similar measures for more general
models to see if the same effects appear there. Second, it would
of interest to repeat our analysis for other Bayesian model
inference methods, for example prediction pools or stacking
(14, 31). Stacking is particularly interesting since it is known
to not necessarily concentrate on a single model when the
sample grows large. Third, we have used the bootstrap to
approximate the sampling distribution of Bayes factors. This
can be very time-consuming when models are analyzed by
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC), since we would have to
run the MCMC for each bootstrap sample. It would therefore
be of practical importance to explore the efficiency of methods
where the marginal likelihood for each bootstrap sample is
obtained by reweighting the posterior draws from a single
MCMC run on the original dataset (32).
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1. Appendix A: Proofs
Preliminaries. The following lemma about Gaussian quadratic forms will be useful.
Lemma 2. Let A1 and A2 be n × n symmetric, nonstochastic matrices, and let y be an n × 1 vector following a normal
distribution, y ∼ N(µ,Σ). Then
i) E(yTA1y) = µTA1µ+ tr(A1Σ);
ii) Var(yTA1y) = 2tr((A1Σ)2) + 4µTA1ΣA1µ;
iii) Cov(yTA1y, yTA2y) = 2tr(A1ΣA2Σ) + 4µTA1ΣA2µ.
Proof. Part i) is a standard result and ii) follows from iii). To derive the covariance in iii) note that
Cov(yTA1y, yTA2y) = E
(
(yTA1y)(yTA2y)
)
− E(yTA1y)E(yTA2y)
and
E
(
(yTA1y)(yTA2y)
)
= E
(
(zTB1z)(zTB2z)
)
,
where z = Σ−1/2y ∼ N(µz, I), µz = Σ−1/2µ and Bj = Σ1/2AjΣ1/2. From Theorem 1 in (33) we have
E
(
(zTB1z)(zTB2z)
)
= E(zTB1z)E(zTB2z) + 2tr(B1B2) + 4µTz B1B2µz,
from which Lemma 2 iii) follows.
Proof of Theorem 1. The log Bayes factor is equal to
n
2 log
(
σ22
σ21
)
+ p1 − p22 log(1− κ) +Q2(y)−Q1(y),
where Qi(y) = 12σ2
i
yT (In −Hi)y and Hi = κPi with Pi = Xi
(
XTi Xi
)−1
XTi being a symmetric and idempotent projection
matrix. Using Part i of Lemma 2, we have
E(log B12(y)) =
n
2 log
(
σ22
σ21
)
+ p1 − p22 log(1− κ) +
σ2∗(n− κp2)
2σ22
− σ
2
∗(n− κp1)
2σ21
+ 12σ22
µT∗ (In −H2)µ∗ − 12σ21
µT∗ (In −H1)µ∗
since tr(σ2∗(In − Hi)) = σ2∗(n − κpi). The term µT∗ (In − Hi)µ∗ can be shown to be a linearly increasing function of the
Kullback-Leibler divergence of Mi with the ideal estimate µˆi = Hiµ∗ from M∗:
KL(M∗||Mi) ≡
∫
log
(
p(y|µ∗)
p(y|µˆi)
)
p(y|µ∗)dy = −n2 log
(
σ2∗
σ2i
)
+ n2
σ2∗
σ2i
+ 12
‖µ∗ − µˆi‖22
σ2i
− n2 ,
using the Kullback-Leibler divergence between two multivariate normal densities (34). To show the exact connection between
E(log B12(y)) and KL(M∗||M2)−KL(M∗||M1) we will here consider the algebraically less involved special case σ1 = σ2. For
this case, the difference in KL divergences simplifies to
KL(M∗||M2)−KL(M∗||M1) = 12
‖µ∗ − µˆ1‖22
σ2
− 12
‖µ∗ − µˆ2‖22
σ2
.
Note that
‖µ∗ − µˆi‖22 = µT∗ µ∗ + κ2µT∗ PiµT∗ − 2κµT∗ PiµT∗ = µT∗ µ∗ − κ(2− κ)µT∗ PiµT∗
so
µT∗ Piµ
T
∗ =
µT∗ µ∗ − ‖µ∗ − µˆi‖22
κ(2− κ) .
When σ1 = σ2 we therefore have that
E(log B12(y)) =
p1 − p2
2
(
log(1− κ) + κσ
2
∗
σ2
)
+ κ2σ2 (µ
T
∗ P1µ∗ − µT∗ P2µ∗)
= p1 − p22
(
log(1− κ) + κσ
2
∗
σ2
)
+ 12− κ (KL(M∗||M2)−KL(M∗||M1)) .
Oelrich et al. | March 10, 2020 | vol. XXX | no. XX | 7
By Part ii and iii of Lemma 2 the variance is
Var(log B12(y)) = Var(Q2(y)) + Var(Q1(y))− 2Cov(Q2(y), Q1(y))
= σ
4
∗
2σ42
tr((In −H2)2) + σ
2
∗
σ42
µT∗ (In −H2)2µ∗ + σ
4
∗
2σ41
tr((In −H1)2) + σ
2
∗
σ41
µT∗ (In −H1)2µ∗
− σ
4
∗
σ21σ
2
2
tr((In −H2)(In −H1))− 2σ
2
∗
σ21σ
2
2
µT∗ (In −H2)(In −H1)µ∗
= σ
4
∗
2 tr
((
(In −H2)
σ22
− (In −H1)
σ21
)2)
+ σ2∗
(
µT∗
(
(In −H2)
σ22
− (In −H1)
σ21
)2
µ∗
)
= σ
4
∗
2 tr
((
(In −H2)
σ22
− (In −H1)
σ21
)2)
+ σ2∗
(
1
σ22
(µ∗ − µˆ2)− 1
σ21
(µ∗ − µˆ1)
)T ( 1
σ22
(µ∗ − µˆ2)− 1
σ21
(µ∗ − µˆ1)
)
.
Assuming that the error variances of the two misspecified models are equal, the expression simplifies to
Var(log B12(y))=
σ4∗
2σ4 tr
(
(H1 −H2)2
)
+ σ
2
∗
σ4
(
µT∗ (H1 −H2)2 µ∗
)
=
(
σ2∗√
2σ2
‖H1 −H2‖F
)2
+
(
σ∗
σ
‖µˆ1 − µˆ2‖2
σ
)2
.
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A. Proof of Theorem 2. We derive the result for the case Σ1 = Σ2. The proof when Σ1 6= Σ2 is similar, but more tedious
algebraically. The log Bayes factor is
log B12(y) =
p1 − p2
2 log(1− κ)−
1
2tr
(
Y T (In −H1)Y Σ−1
)
+ 12tr
(
Y T (In −H2)Y Σ−1
)
= p1 − p22 log(1− κ)−
1
2tr
(
Y T (H2 −H1)Y Σ−1
)
= p1 − p22 log(1− κ)−
1
2vec(Y )
T
(
Σ−1 ⊗ (H2 −H1)
)
vec(Y ),
where vec(Y ) ∼ N (vec(µ∗),Σ∗ ⊗ In), µ∗ = X∗B∗, and Hi = κPi with Pi = Xi
(
XTi Xi
)−1
XTi . Using Lemma 2, we obtain the
mean as
E(log B12(Y )) =
p1 − p2
2 log(1− κ)−
1
2(vec(µ∗))
T
(
Σ−1 ⊗ (H2 −H1)
)
vec(µ∗)− 12tr
((
Σ−1 ⊗ (H2 −H1)
)
Σ∗ ⊗ In
)
= p1 − p22 log(1− κ)−
1
2tr
(
µT∗ (H2 −H1)µ∗Σ−1
)
− 12tr
(
Σ−1Σ∗ ⊗ (H2 −H1)
)
= p1 − p22 log(1− κ) +
1
2tr
(
µT∗H1µ∗Σ−1
)
− 12tr
(
µT∗H2µ∗Σ−1
)
− 12tr
(
Σ−1Σ∗
)
tr (H2 −H1)
= p1 − p22 log(1− κ) +
1
2tr
(
µT∗H1µ∗Σ−1
)
− 12tr
(
µT∗H2µ∗Σ−1
)
− 12tr
(
Σ−1Σ∗
)
κ (p2 − p1)
Similarly to the proof of the univariate case in Theorem 1, we can relate the terms tr
(
µT∗Hiµ∗Σ−1
)
to the Kullback-Leibler
divergence between p(Y |µ∗) and p(Y |µˆi). The Kullback-Leibler divergence of p(Y |µˆi) from p(Y |µ∗) can be derived by employing
the usual KL divergence between multivariate normals in (34) to p(vec(Y )|vec(µ∗)) and p(vec(Y )|vec(µˆi)) to obtain
KL(M∗||Mi) = 12
(
log |Σi ⊗ In||Σ∗ ⊗ In| − nd+ tr
(
(Σ−1i ⊗ In)(Σ∗ ⊗ In)
)
+ (vec(µ∗)− vec(µˆi))T (Σ−1i ⊗ In)(vec(µ∗)− vec(µˆi))
)
= 12
(
n log |Σi||Σ∗| − nd+ ntr
(
Σ−1i Σ∗
)
+ tr
(
(µ∗ − µˆi)T (µ∗ − µˆi)Σ−1i
))
= 12
(
−n log |Σ∗||Σi| − nd+ ntr
(
Σ−1i Σ∗
)
+
∥∥∥(µ∗ − µˆi)Σ−1/2i ∥∥∥2
F
)
,
where
∥∥∥(µ∗ − µˆi)Σ−1/2i ∥∥∥2
F
is the Mahalanobis distance with respect to Σi. Analogous calculations as in the univariate case
gives
tr
(
µT∗Hiµ∗Σ−1
)
=
tr
(
µT∗ µ∗Σ−1
)
−
∥∥∥(µ∗ − µˆi)Σ−1/2i ∥∥∥2
F
2− κ
and hence we can express the mean as
E(log B12(Y )) =
p1 − p2
2 log(1− κ) +
1
2
∥∥∥(µ∗ − µˆ2)Σ−1/22 ∥∥∥2
F
− 12
∥∥∥(µ∗ − µˆ1)Σ−1/21 ∥∥∥2
F
2− κ −
1
2tr
(
Σ−1Σ∗
)
κ (p2 − p1)
= KL(M∗||M2)−KL(M∗||M1)2− κ +
p1 − p2
2
(
log(1− κ) + κtr
(
Σ−1Σ∗
))
.
Var(log B12(Y )) =
1
2tr
{(
Σ−1 ⊗ (H2 −H1)
)
(Σ∗ ⊗ In)
}2 + vec(µ∗)T (Σ−1 ⊗ (H2 −H1)) (Σ∗ ⊗ In) (Σ−1 ⊗ (H2 −H1)) vec(µ∗)
= 12tr
(
Σ−1Σ∗Σ−1Σ∗ ⊗ (H2 −H1)2
)
+ vec(µ∗)T
(
Σ−1Σ∗Σ−1 ⊗ (H2 −H1)2
)
vec(µ∗)
= 12tr
(
Σ−1Σ∗Σ−1Σ∗
)
‖H2 −H1‖2F + tr
(
µT∗ (H2 −H1)2µ∗Σ−1Σ∗Σ−1
)
= 12tr
(
Ω2
)
‖H2 −H1‖2F + tr
((
(µˆ2 − µˆ1)Σ−1/2
)T ((µˆ2 − µˆ1)Σ−1/2)Ω)
= 12tr
(
Ω2
)
‖H2 −H1‖2F +
∥∥(µˆ2 − µˆ1)Σ−1/2Ω1/2∥∥2
F
where Ω ≡ Σ−1/2Σ∗Σ−1/2 is a multivariate generalization of the variance ratio σ2∗/σ2.
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Proof of Lemma 1. We first state the following definition from (35).
Definition 1. Let S1, S2 ⊂ Rn be subspaces with p1 = dim(S1) ≥ dim(S2) = p2 ≥ 1. The principal angles θk ∈ [0, pi/2] between
S1 and S2 are recursively defined for k = 1, ..., p2 by
cos(θk) = max
u∈S1
max
v∈S2
|uT v| = uTk vk, ||u|| = ||v|| = 1,
subject to the constraints
uTi u = 0, vTi v = 0, i = 1, ..., k − 1.
Now,
tr(H1 −H2)2 = κ2tr(P1 − P2)2 = κ2
(
tr(P1) + tr(P2)− 2tr(P1P2)
)
= κ2
(
p1 + p2 − 2
n∑
i=1
λi
)
,
where λi are the eigenvalues of P1P2. Theorem 34 in (35) proves that eig(P1P2) = (1s, cos2 θs+i (i = 1, ..., r), 0n−s−r) where 1s
is an s× 1 vector of ones, 0n−s−r is an (n− s− r)× 1 vector of zeroes, s = dim(S1 ∩ S2) is the number of θj which are exactly
zero, and r is the number of θj in the open interval (0, pi/2). Hence
tr(P1 − P2)2 = κ2
(
p1 + p2 − 2
(
s+
r∑
i=1
cos2(θk+i)
))
.
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